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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

J. REAL,
Plaintiff and Appellunl,
Ca:->e Xo.

90±!
.\L.\L\ l•:. I'O\VELL nnd 1\L\W;ARE'J'
E. PO'Nl•:LL, hi;; wife,
Drfendaul> u11r/ H1 -'')!0mlc,tts.

REPLY BRH:l" 01' AI'l'ELLAXI

POIKT L
THE ACTIVITTF.S OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSTG:'\!OR,
UNION, DO NOT FALL WlTHJN THE DEFINITION OF
"RF:AL ESTATE BROKER," COKT,\I).!ED I:'\! ::iEC. til-2-2.
C.C.A. 1953.
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POINT II.

SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U,C.A. 1953, IMPOSE
AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COM:\lERCE AS APPLIF:D TO THE CONDU.CT AND ACTIVITIES
01" UNION.
POINT III.
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, ARE UNCONSTITUTIO~AL

CNDER THE DCE PROCESS AND
EQl:AL PROTECTION CLAl.'SES OJ<' THE FEDERAL COXSTlTL'TlON AS APPLIED TO THE FA-CTS OF THIS CASE.
POINT IV.
SECS. 61-2-1, 62-2-2 AND 6-2-18, UCA 1953, AS THEY

APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE ARE UNCONSTITCTIONAL AS BEING IK VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE

OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.

ARGLHEXT
POINT I.
THE

ACTIVITIES

OF

PLAINTIFF'S

ASSIGNOR,

CNION, DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF
"REAL ESTATE BROKER," CONTAINED IN SEC. 61-2-2,
U.C.A. 1953.

On Page 0 of respondent',<; brief, it i~ stated that the
adiviti~'~ of l'nion l'llll~i~l ol' thl' following:
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(1)

It

lis(.~

(:2)

Ir

adverti~e~

real

(31

H

a~~i::;t~

dirw·t~

or

att~·liJjil~

or

to lid real estate

P~tate

in the proc·nring of pr%-

pects ealculnlo..•d to result in the ::mle of real estate.
\hth re;;pert to (1) ahow, t.he 11or·d
definite meaning in the real

·•Jist~-,

e~tatP indu.~try

haH a

a::; denoting

the tt<.:r:c:plnnc·c~ of a :;ellc·t··~ propo~al to ~ell his real prop-

,•rt:· and to endeavor to find purehast"l'H
Union did nol atkttlpl l.o do, anfl the
~pondent>~'

lation oi

any

fad~

in

~lau_·rtt{·rrt

thi~ en~e

II'Ord 11a~

wher·e lhat

attorney~

for

prospective

pun·ha~er~

~ellerdirec·tly
A~

to

property hut agreed only

;;l'rvire~

eontraded I'rom which

might contart the advertising

(]{..10,11).

(~)above,

;;w:h activity

i~

not defined

fls

it

ftli[ICar:>

extent that "or

pects" lilerall.\

u~;;i;;ts

on

rc~poudc•nt'~

a~

phu~t·~

estate broker under any of tlw italieized

011

stritkt·n

for the parties for the very

advf'rti~Pr·~

to perfo 1'111 the advP t'l i~ing

tic~.

in re-

that L'nion did 110l undertake ot· cudeavor to find

purcha~en<

section

it. This

brief that it did flie::< in the face of the .stipu-

out and initialed h:rea~on

fl>l'

of that

brief except to lh,•

or directs in the pro\'nring ol·

L'W"\)IIIpu~~e~

(::!) ahove, of roume,

a real

pro~

thi:; nnd 111any other arti\·i-

rui~P:-<

thi,; point, this ·Court i,; agn.in

lf1n it had he fore in the A..11dn

tlw

~ame

C[UPstiou.

fnrni~lwd

,oil t·a~~~

Thn~,

IYith the pmlo.

when• it

wa~

held
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that those words are not tu be given literal application.
Respondent~

endeavor to distinguish that case. Surely,

however, one who, ·without a license,

pcr~onally

con-

tacts pro:>pective ,;ellers for a real estate broker is
assisting to some extent in procuring of prospects.

~'o

the extent that there is a difference in degree, appellant

fmbmits that the ar-tivi1 if'~ of l'nion's agens are more

re~

!note than that of the plaintiff in tl1e And a son ease. The
distinction as to what assistance brings one within the
terms of the suhjed section made in thai case is "those
whil'lt n'sult )II legal liability between the parties." Certainly nothing the agent of

T~nion

doe,; in any way effects

legal liability between any buyer and seller any more than

the activities of the 8tcnographer or man who introduoos
the real estate broker do.
POINT II.
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, L".C.A. 1953, IMPOSE
AN UNREASONABLE BGRDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE AS APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES
OF UNION.

Appellant

rlnr~

not take

i,;~m·

11·ith t1Je authorities

\·ited bY respondent undt>r this point but contends that
they do not have any applieation to our case. It
~a.1·
i~

i~

idle to

that tlwrP i.,; no interference (or that the intcrferenct-

in\·onsequential) 11 ith an admittedly

intrr~tate

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

acti\·ity

5
of publishing and advertising heeau,;e the latlN are not
~im:t·

prohibited (and could not l1e
~tak)

the
of

hi<·h 1nake,; it difl'ienlt or
advt>rii~ing

the publication since

~neh

the sole source ol' n•renue I'll"
Hespondcnts'
l'tuli

i'·,'a./t Lake

L'.

out~idc

when burdens are placed upon the proer11·ing

advertiser~ 11

~u~tain

tl1e:· are done

ati<>IIIJ!I~
TriiJIIIW

f'riuliniJ awi Publislii·u:J

iHlpOP~ihlt>

to

eontratb a 1'1'

un enterprise.

In dii:iting·trif'h tlu• ra;;eE of

Publi,,fiill(/ Company and l'oo·t
Cuiilf!Uii.IJ

r. ffrew.~ter on the

g-round that the legislation there prohibiteU the adYertising

it~ell

ackno11IPrlgb t.lmt Ow

~tah•

,-,mid not

din~rtly

Jlrohibit circulation of the advertising in question. Is it
an.v more Ia ll'i'ul to prevent

~1wh

ci rr·ulal ion by preventing

the solicitation of the advertising matter to be circulated!
II' one tna: la\\'fully

pniJli~lt

and c·irculate advertising,

why may he not a.ssernble the material I
l~eO:]JOndents

contend that the requirements for

Fnion\ agent,; to l1nalil'y as real estate brokerR are nut
unreasonable. Appellant ask,; why should it be
to

pa~s

an examination in real

e~tate

Ja,,·,

neee~sary

a('qui.~ition

of titles, deeds, leases, mortgages, land eon I 1·:wL~, agency
contracts, licnii, ;-;oning, taxation, aud the pro\""isions of
Chapter fil, L:.C.A. HJ;J:1, for one who
Jlectivc

~ellcrs

ne~pondenl~

tlte

bu~in('>~-~

of

have failed to

~oli(·it><

advel"ti~ing·

sugge~t

l'rom pros-

their prop1:rt.1· .'

\l·iLy rotupetency in
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~uch

real e;;iate detaiL; should be

ing the

propertic~

TJeccs:;ar·y

for

adverti~

fO!' sak. lles1)0ndcnb, further, omit

entirely any rei'erencc to the provision::; of Section 61-2-(i
which also require,.; of rwr><om; who are not Jicen8ed real
e~tate hroker·~ of' otl11_.r ~tates who have reciprocal laws
and maintain a place of bminess there: (l) 3 years

fX-

pcrience as a real estate salesman or its equivalent, (2)

maintaining a place of lmsiness here (3) personal knowledge recommendations a;; to character by three Utah

property owners.
POINT III.
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, ARE U)fCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE DCE PROCESS MW
EQUAL PROTECTIO::->f CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS APPLIED TO THE FA-CTS OF THIS CASE.

Appellant

contend~

that it

i~

unconstitutional for a

legi8lature to arbitrarily define an advertiser
e~tate

a~

a real

broker or· salesman. Apparently, respondents do

not disp.ute the fact that See. 61-:.l-2 hru; done thlli to the
extent it includes the

actiYitie~

spondents have not taken

i~sue

of rnion. Further, re.

with appellant\ brief that

this can not Le done comistcntl.1 with constitutional
principles.
Appellant docs not argue that real estate brokers
JJIH.I

not be regulated or that the twtiYities of rnion may
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not be regulated "c•un::;i::;tentl;.- with constitutionallimitat .lOll~. " \Yhat appellanl

dnt·~

t·onlend i:; that Union can

not be regulawd in the :;ame manner that a rca\
broker may be constitntionall.1 l"t·t-;ulat.cd

not a real

L·~tate

11ilf'n

e~late

Lnion

i~

broker and that it is unconstitutional

to define one as a real estatr• brokc1· ll'ho

i~

not one in

fact.
Respondent::; contend that the Xe11r England eases

ur

[:niter/ Interclwnge, Inc. v. Spellacy and I ·,lited lnterc/,an_(Je. /w;,

o/ .lfos.wu:lwse/1.,

1.

Hort!illff.·

failed to take

note of tlw potential harm to the public from
~uch

as T"nion.

'l'hi~

i:; a

actiYilie~

pi'IO~utnptiou:; ;;tatL'IHtnt

and not

in accordance with the fact. In United luterchrwge v.

Spellacy the Connecticut :-lupl'cwc Court said:
·"l'he onb reason advan~ed for the nerd and
design of this anwndmPnt i~ to }JI'('\'l'nt fraud. a
purpos(· 1rhid1 has always IJeen considered legitimate for the cxt•rci~e of police pm1er when the
facts warranted it (citing eases). A legitimatr
purpose, however, can not justi 1\ an unreaf!onalJk
and unnecessarib· arbitrary di~nirninator;;
method of aecomplishing it (citing ea~e::;).
"The legislative pom:r· to regulate a busine~~
fraug-ht \\'ith particular danger to the pul1li<• i~
nmeh \\·ider than in the case of an ot·dinary Ja,,·ful
busineo:s ~urh ao: advertising. 'In the one busine~~
no riti11en has an ahsoluk right to eJlgt~!j'(•; in Ute
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8
other all r·itizen~ l1ave a right and and f''Jilal right
to engage. 'l'hc differt'nce i~ vitaL' (State v. Conlor!, G5 Conn. -t7b, -1-%, 33, J19) \Vherc the Lusines~ is a la\l'i'ul one 1md involves no part.iculal'
danger to thE' publi" tht• regulation must not be
unreasonably
. in exec~~ of what is nece~."IV\"
. to
accomplish the suppo:>ed end; and in the t'ase or
a bu.~ine~~ in '' hid1 all citizens havoe a right and
an equal right to engage, the principle of ertuality
of right~ mu~t in this starr he observed. (Statr
v. Porter, 94-l'onn. 639, G4:l, 11A ;)9; 30 ~\111. Jur.
378, 40) ,,
ln order to i·oJJstitute a reasonable cxcrcMe of the
police power, there must be a reasonable connection between the requirements of ihe law and the purpose to be
achieved by it. In

thi~

ca:-;e the purpose ostensibly would

be to prevent misrepresentations concerning selling of
such advNtising. Are these requirements rcasrmably
calculated to aeliievc sm•h purpose or arc they eakulated
to prevent such

busine~s -!

Fraudulent sales are

ju~t

as

likely and possible in many other fields and the equal
protection clause ,,·ould n•quire that all prrwns similarly
situated would be treated like\\·ise.
'l'he

snppo~ed

danger t·nn adcquatel: be taken care

of as in the normal cast' of fraud, a defen:-;e
tlw

respondent~

in

thi~ r-n~P.

a~.<(•rted b~·

The advertising fee

i~

not

pnynbl" until af/cr tl1c' ~t'tTin·~ lntn• been pcrfonm~d anrl
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tltc• adn·rti~1·r need not rely ~olely on the good faith of

T:nion a::; respondents
thi~

voint, r'""pondrnt"' have made no attempt
Clllltf'nd that U:< appliecl to rnion, See. Gl-:!-~. l_~.C.A.
l'ndi·t·

t<>

a~:;c~J·t.

l!J."1:;,

define·~ n~

~n 1 •1i.

Thev concede that

a real

t·~talc'

hroker a party who

~uch aetivitiL·~

identical 1vith lhe {'Ottnnonly accephcd
e<tate broker or

~alesman

''tUT

TWl

i~

not

precif'ely

fnndion~

of real

under a trade ot ,-oJtmwrcial

dt·l'inition." Xot only nrr tllPy not precisely identical

but m·e not in
ul' what

an~- 1nt~-

eon~lilntb

,,·itltin an_, m·c•eptablc derinition

a real P"tate broker. Respondent:>

haw (·ited no rase;; ,,-hid! eonstitutionally permit a party
being arbitrarily defined and clasf'ified in a group in
\\'hich he in fact does not belong. In TVI1ilu•111/; -c. f.'mn,,. " I. .\PI~ _
''(d)_,, ,.,,-1.,
.. , '1('9 11-:1 I'-ae.-(
·• 'd) ...
"J"
~'1>1,-+-''-a
,c,a
statute providing for tl1e lil'ensing of

eo~metologists

examination defined the term ·eosnwtolog_\' in
way a~ to indnde hair dressing,

mas~age,

~ul'h

a

and manienrinp;.

The plaintif[ in that rase had long pradin•d as a
eu~e.

after

mas~

The hoard rharged with administering the statute

ordered her to

eea~e 1'~'1'1\)l'miJlg-

any ;wti\1'

tlhtlidulog~

until she had obtained a license. The plaintiff had never
studied hair dn-.§inp; or manirnring, had no training or
}ll'Oiieic•ncy in the::!l' partieuln.r hranehes ol' 1·osmetology
a~ defined],- the ~tatute, and eonklnol Jlll~~ an examination in them. The conn held that although an aetivit_l-
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not harmful in itself might endanger the public health,
sat'ety, and general welfare if pmctieed b.1- an inexperi~'need

and incompetent

~ubject

IJer~on

and, therefore, he a proper

for regulation, a statute which prevented a

per~ on

from rarrying on the lawful occupation of masseuse unless she c-ould also qualify Uildcr the ;:;tatute as a hair
Urcsser

1\·a,;

an uncon::;titutional exercise of logislative

power. A similar linf' of rea;;oning controlled the
deci~ion

in the following {'a~e~: Protll:if

16S, 176,

:2~1J

~_-_ Henm,

court'~

1:2< Colo.

P. :!(d) /;)J; Rrnff r·. Summers, 76 Tdaho

-J--iG, ±;J:!. :2~:1 I'i:2d) 1093; People r. Schaeffer, 310 Ill.
57--1-, ~:'.(}, 143 .:\]•; :2+S; S'cully r.llallilwu, 3fi5 T11.185, 191,
(j NE 2(d) 176; J,,fuu,ou ~_-_ F:n-in, 205 Jlinn. 84, SS, 285
\\\' 07; People r.
Euu1~'

Rl•l()C,

197 X.Y. 1-±3. 149, 90 XE 451;

c. Baldrige, :!9-t Pa. 1-±:2, 1-H A 97; Timmons r.

.llorri.,, :271 F 7:!1, 7:27; Baker ;·. Doly.

J.'j

l<' :2(d)

~S1,

SS:!.
In the

\'Pl'.l'

rr.rr.nt rase of

A. Sawge, 3..\:2 P:2
ltc•ld thrrr

ality of

2..\~J.

ll'.

thr. California Supreme Court

wa~ ~nb~tantial

~lnttlli·~

[~niiJn Interdwn!Jf t.

doubt a;; to the constitution-

prohibiting identical Rdivities of this

appr.llant's assignor.
POINT IV.
S.ECS. 61-2-1, 62-2-2 AND 6-2-18, UC'A 1953, AS THEY
APPLY TO THE F.\CT::; OF THIS C\SE ARE UNCONSTI-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
Tl:TIONAL AS RET~G IK VIOLATlO:-:f OF THE PRINCIPLE
OF FREEDOM OF '1'111:: PRBSS.
Hespondent~'

argument that there wa.s no intcrl'er-

enee with the freedoJll ul' the

jJT'l'l'~

herein bceause the

(Ttah statntf' imposh no direel re,.;traint or prohibition on
!"nion'~

publication

\1-;h

effedi.vel,\· dealt with by the

Supreme Court of Maine in the cao:e of I 'nited Inter.

change. l11c. of Jlas::;.

1·.

HunliJ,(f, in

the~e word~;

''ThE' pn",;~ can be deprived of ib liberty a.~
quickly b,\· pt'l'\ iou~ l'C.,;lraint,; whieh de~tro;.· ib
source~ of revenue as by rigid eensor.ship. If by
an arlifi(·ial licensing device the hm;iness of peti-

tioners can he curtailed or terminated,

1n· .Sl'l'

no

obstacle for l'urtber encroachment on freedom of
the pres~ by restrictive legislative device aimerl
at specific media or even at the whole indu~;try:'
Surely the

~tatute

in question here dRstroys Lnion 's

sources of revenue because of the impracticality of its
agent8 becomirJg real

e~tate

brokers and of

fut·ni~hing

the personal character references tCiluired by our
of real

e~tah'

lJrokers.

Respondent'~

"the regulation of l:nion',

law>~

brief concedes thai

adivitiP.~

11\a_v have .some

slight effeet on appellant',; sources of revRnne:· (Page
13). It i~ difficult to ~N' how respondents can contend
that the efl'rc·t on L:nion's puhlicalion and ('ireulation ol'
its periorlicals is ~o J·r•tnotc and oh~ct!l'(• a~ to be of 110
eonsequenee when the~· l'ail tu 1·vr·n di.~l·n,;::; the limitation

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
they would

impo~e

on

l~nio11'~

agl_"llt with respect to pass-

in;:r: written examinations in fields unrelated to their
activity and
t>~·r~onal

when

l'urni~hi_ng

evidence from reo:idcnts

a~

to

knowledge of their agent'r; good moral character

~uch

agenh; almoo:t invariably are non-residents.

ltcsponderJl.~

acknowledge that the i\laiw· ease citeU

above is directly in point and eonlrar.\ to tlucir position
in this

ea~e.

Although 1() l" .•J.::-l. 112:3, Constitutional Law, Sec.
~D(8)c

111aki:~

ihc hroad slatPment that freedom of

speech and pre6s

impo~c

regulation ol' commercial

no

J"l:~lraints

aetivitiL·~

on governmental

sueh

a~

eonJHI('rt'ial

advcdio:ing, all ol" the caReR cited for such 6tatement and
hy

respor~dentr;

here deal

11

ith t1) the power of a muni-

cipality to regulate business 011 their r;treetfl ·without violating l"reedom ol"

~peech

or

~u\'11 bu~inP><~ actiYitiP~ .•\~

prt6~

or (:!) power to tax

stated in the case of Pills-

ford r. Cil!! of Los Angdrl', (1:!:! P:!.-J:!.-J) the issue there

was "the right to distribute coHllnercial advertising Juatlc-r~

upon vublic dn·l"l~ and thorough-fares." Xo such
qne~tion is involnd in this ra><e.
It i~ true that mnnicipalitie~ ma~- constitutionally

prohibit rommereial a<"liYilit·~ carried upon higlnvays,
.~tn·d~. or on ~id1•\\alk~ 11·ithout Yiol<ltinp: the freedom
of "1'1'('('11 pr tJI'P~~ g1mranteed by the l'om,titntion be-
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cause streets,
~r!y,

sidf'\ntllc~,

and no one has a

This court in 1he

ca~l'

and highways are public prop-

ve~ted

right to do business there.

ol' ,','Iuter

1· . •'-!ult

Lake City, 201i P.

2(d) 153, carefully pointed out that the ordinance m
rtnestion did not prohibit tl1e sale of magazines in other
portiono: of the city than on
which

con~titute

(he congested

l'l't·(ain ~pL·c·il'ied ~tr·ecl~
bu~ine;;s di~triet

of the

city iu question. In thi~ case, however·, thl' n·~pondcnt:;
contend that T-nion may not properl:· enter into the ('Ontracts anywheTP in the State of l"tah without obtaining
Lrokcr~

license. On the contrary, in the r·n.,e
of' fJitts_tord r. Cilp of Los Angdc.,·, r·ited h.1 rc::;pondent~,

a real e8tate

it is stated:
"1'he conduct of sirietly eomrnercial ael ivi 1ic·~
may, under eertain circumstanre:;;, involve the
exercise of free speech and a l'ece prei\s and under
such circwnstance~ prohibition of certain commercial practice,; might r.oJH·c·ivably be hPld io
abridge the~c con~titutional rights . . . . lt does
not follow that where an ordinance regulating or
prohibiting the trani\action or bn:>ine~s npon the
publie streets n1a.1· 1Je .~aid to hear a rca~onalJ!e
relation to the public welfarP, i!Hrh an ordimmce
may be set aside upon the ground that it encroache~ llpon liberty of ~pr·l·t•li and ]liP><~. Such
libertieR in conner·tion with comn1crt·ial adivitie::;
may ordinarily be exerci~ed in some other man liN"
than upon the public ~treet~."
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In the

ca~e

at bar, 1TTlinn·s agents were not distribut-

lllg" any commercial or mixed commercial and political
matter upon the public Htrl•el as
to Le enjoined in the

ca~c

wa~

the party sought

of V(J/enliue r. Chri,;ten.'fll,

(l'\c11 York) (i:! ~ St. 0:20, 31G r.0. ~~:2, SG L. Ed. l2U:L

}.. IJpdlant. takes no exception to that case.
Appellant does not. eonlend that. the

arlivitie~

of

rnion are beyond the vower of a lllUlli(·ipality or a state
to tax. The

ca~c

of Rc1dxu H. Dmmelly Corp v. Cily o.f

Hrllrr,te (K;·.) HQ

~\\"

2d lUU, which held that a. city

may constitutionall.1· ln·.1· a tax upon circulation of comtnercia.l ad1·ertising without violating freedom of the
lJlT~s ha~

no appliration to

thi~

case. In short, the

here is whether rnion must obtain a real

e~tate

is~ue

broker's

license in order to negotiate advertising eontracts a.ny1\-hcn• in tltc Slatf' of 1"tah and not whether such activitit>s nmy be prohibited on public

thoroughfare~

or are

immune from taxation.

CONCL1'Sl0::\
The adivities of l"nion do not come ,,·ithin the provi~ion~

of our real P~!ate licen~ing- ~tatute~. Such ~tatutf'~

if apjlliPd to plnintitT.:; a~signor IHE' mleon,;titutional a~
being· in \" iolation of tilL' c·mnmerce clau~(.', the due proeP;~
and '''tual pl"nkdion clau~e. and freedom of pre~s of
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l:i

the Federal l'on~titution. The order ot di~missal based
on said statutes ·wu~ in error and should be Yaeated aml
tlw case remanded to the Di;;trid Court or Salt Lake

County l"or further proceeding;; to dPterminP the merits,

if any, of re~pondent;;' defen>,cs
affinuative defenses.
RespceHully

ba~ed

on fraud and other

~ubrnitted,

HOBERT B. HAKSE?\
H. LO"\YELL RALP II
.l/l"ruP.I/:0: for Appellant

G:)

4th t:louth
I jake Cit~·, Utah

F:a~t

~alt
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